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The aim of this paper is to analyze the determinants of multiple-bank lending - one of the 
main features of the bank-firm relationships in Italy. The analysis suggests that multiple 
bank lending is significantly and importantly linked with firms’ governance 
characteristics. In particular, it emerges that firms adopting a less formalised model of 
governance - which could denote lower informational transparency or, more in general, 
lesser degree of protection of third creditors - are characterised by a greater level of 
multiple-bank lending. In this respect multiple-bank lending may be the consequence of a 
risk averse attitude of banks and thus constitutes a sort of insurance mechanisms whereby 
banks overcome difficulties in assessing their customer firms. 
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 1  Introduction 
 
Bank credit represents the main source of funding for Italian firms: according to the 
Italian Central Balance Sheet Office (Centrale dei Bilanci, hereinafter Ce.Bi.) data around 
70% of firms’ total financial debts is constituted by bank debt. In addition, the share of 
bank debts to total debts of manufacturing companies is almost double the average 
recorded in France, Spain and Germany (29% vs. 15%: source EU Commission Bach 
Database). 
 
Given the key role that banks play in financing Italian firms an analysis of the 
characteristics of the bank-firm relationships in Italy is relevant, since these features may 
impact the screening and monitoring activities conducted by banks. Indeed, as known, the 
lender-borrower relationship is typically characterized by asymmetric information 
problems which may result in some investment projects not being financed despite 
having positive expected returns. In this context, it is generally recognised that banks 
have a role in reducing information asymmetries. It is also acknowledged that the ability 
of banks to reduce such information asymmetries is strictly connected with the ways they 
relate to their borrowers, namely the bank-firm relationship. 
 
Against this backdrop, the aim of this paper is to analyse one of the main characteristics 
of bank-firm relationships in Italy: multiple-bank lending, namely the fact that firms tend 
to have credit relationships with several banks. There is extensive theoretical and 
empirical literature on this topic,
1 which highlights that multiple-bank lending may reflect 
banks’ behaviour aimed at reducing the concentration of exposures towards a single 
counterpart, or it may stem from the fact that firms use multiple banking relationships in 
order to reduce the risk of being rationed or alternatively in order to pay lower interest 
rates (as in Detragiache et al 2000). Another explanation, recently suggested by Carletti 
et al. (2004), is that the degree of multiple-bank lending is positively associated with the 
costs incurred by banks in monitoring their customers.  
 
                                                 
1   See the survey by Boot, A. W. A. (2000). 
 This paper attempts to provide an empirical contribution to the literature on the 
determinants of multiple bank lending relationships. This is done by using the Italian 
Credit Register and UniCredit Banca d’Impresa’s (UBI) internal data for a sample of 
more than 20,000 Italian enterprises. In order to examine the relationship between the 
degree of multiple bank lending and firms’ governance features, these data are then 
combined with the results of a survey on corporate governance recently conducted by 
UBI on a sample of 834 customer firms. Indeed, the main argument of this paper is that 
multiple-bank-lending may reflect the degree of firms’ informational opaqueness and/or 
weaknesses in their governance structure. This is in line with Carletti et al. (2004) about 
the role of monitoring costs in explaining the degree of firms’ multiple-bank lending. It is 
intuitive, in fact, that monitoring costs might be related to firms’ informational 
opaqueness or, more in general, to governance structures providing a lesser degree of 
protection to the so-called outsiders (minority shareholders, third creditors, etc.). This 
would lead to argue that multiple-bank lending might constitute an insurance mechanism 
whereby banks try to overcome difficulties in assessing their customer firms. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some descriptive 
evidence on the degree of multiple-bank lending in Italy, whose basic results are 
exploited in section 3, where the determinants of multiple lending relationships are 
analysed by means of regression models. The link between firms’ governance and bank-
firm relationships’ features is then analysed in section 4. Finally, section 5 summarises 
the main results of the paper and outlines the conclusions.  
 
 
2  The degree of multiple-bank lending in Italy: some descriptive evidence 
 
As noted one distinguished features of bank-firm relationships in Italy is multiple-bank 
lending. According to the Italian Credit Register data, referred to a sample of 20,000 
firms at the end of 2003, Italian companies had a median of 7 banks each.
2 
 
                                                 
2   Another feature is the widespread presence of guarantees, both real and personal: indeed 82% of 
the firms recorded in Credit Register had loans supported by personal or real guarantees Multiple-bank lending is widely diffused even in other countries, both in Europe and 
outside Europe, but in Italy it seems to have a greater weight than elsewhere. Indeed, 
Ongena and Smith (2000) look at the number of bank relationships for a sample of 1,079 
large European enterprises and find that Italian firms are characterised by the highest 
degree of multiple-bank lending relationships (15.2 banks per firm vs. an average of 5.6 
for the whole sample). This has in Italy historical roots which can be traced back to the 
ways the banking system developed at the end of the Second World War, but especially 
in the administrative measures of credit control adopted during the seventies (e.g. 
portfolio constraints and lending limits – see Cotula et al. 1999).  
 
However, besides the international comparison and the elements of historical nature, an 
analysis of the distribution of firms according to the number of banking relationships 
highlights a certain degree of heterogeneity, namely the fact that a significant share of 
enterprises maintain relationships with a relatively low number of banks, while other 
firms have an higher degree of multiple bank lending. Chart 1, for example, highlights 
that 16.6% of the firms have relationships with up to three banks.
3 
 
                                                 
3   The number of banking relationships is in Italy a truncated variable, i.e. for confidentiality reasons 






























Source: Italian Credit Register and UBI Datawarehouse Corporate 
 
These initial results call for a closer look at those elements which might be associated 
with the different degree of multiple-bank lending of Italian companies. 
 
In this context, a relevant variable might certainly be the size of the firm. It is likely, in 
fact, that the number of banking relationships could increase as firms grow. In the first 
instance, this could be owing to the fact that banks, in order to diversify their risks, are 
less willing to have sizeable exposures towards large firms. The positive relationship 
between degree of multiple-bank lending and size may also reflect the greater opaqueness 
of smaller firms. Indeed, most small firms do not publish balance sheets and when these 
are available they are less informative and less reliable respect to larger firms. Moreover, 
small firms are typically young, and have thus a lower track-record than companies of a 
larger size. This renders the credit worthiness of small firms more difficult to be assessed 
by external financiers, making it optimal that few or a single bank developed a 
knowledge of the firm aimed at evaluating its degree of risk. However, as will emerge later on in this paper, the inverse relationship between informational opaqueness and the 
degree of multiple-bank lending seems to hold only for very small firms, while for 
medium enterprises the informational opaqueness appears to be positively associated with 
the degree of multiple bank lending. 
 
The distribution of the number of banking relationships according to size highlights that, 
in fact, the size variable matters: larger firms tend to have an higher number of banking 
relationships (Table 1). However, even a material percentage of smaller firms is 
characterized by multiple-bank lending relationships. For example, about 22% of the 
enterprises with revenues up to 5 mln euros have lending relationships with more than 6 
banks, the percentage increases to 55% for those firms with revenues between 5 and 10 
mln euros. This evidence would then suggest that the size might not be the sole variable 
relevant in explaining the number of bank-firm relationships. 
 
 
Table. 1: multiple-bank lending and firm size 
enterprises % Median Up to 3 4 5 6 7 Over 7 Total
up to 5 4 35.6 16.6 14.6 10.8 8.4 14.1 100
from 5 to 10 7 10.8 9.4 11.8 12.8 11.0 44.2 100
from 10 to 15 9 6.4 6.3 8.5 9.0 10.4 59.4 100
from 15 to 25 9 4.4 4.8 6.9 7.3 9.2 67.4 100
from 25 to 50 11 3.2 3.2 4.1 5.6 6.4 77.4 100
from 50 to 100 13 2.7 3.0 2.3 4.1 4.3 83.5 100
Over 100 16 1.9 1.2 3.4 2.5 2.7 88.3 100


































Source: Credit Register and UBI Datawarehouse Corporate 
 
The age of the firm also appears to be positively associated with the degree of multiple 
bank lending: the number of banking relationships increases as the firm becomes older 
(Table 2). However, the correlation seems, in this case, less robust. Indeed, even 
relatively young firms are characterized by a fairly high degree of multiple-bank lending. For instance 34% of the firms who’s age is up to two years old have relationships with 
more than 7 banks. This could perhaps be due to the degree of risk of the firm, in the 
sense that banks may perceive some firms as being too risky and therefore limit their 
exposures towards them.  
 
Table 2: multiple-bank lending and age of the firm 
M e d i a n U p  t o  3 4567 O v e r  7 T o t a l
Up to 2 5 32.7 8.9 11.0 8.9 4.2 34.3 100
from 3 to 5 7 20.9 9.4 8.0 8.6 9.5 43.6 100
from 6 to 10 7 15.3 9.2 9.4 9.7 8.7 47.8 100
from 11 to 20 8 11.1 7.9 9.3 9.8 9.4 52.5 100
from 21 to 30 8 8.4 7.7 9.5 8.8 8.4 57.1 100
from 31 to 50 9 7.0 7.4 8.8 8.3 9.5 59.0 100
Over 50 10 7.7 4.8 6.3 8.3 7.8 65.0 100


























Source: Credit Register and UBI Datawarehouse Corporate 
 
 
This interpretation finds some empirical support when looking at Table 3 which shows 
that high-risk firms (as measured by the Ce.Bi rating)
4 are characterized by an higher 
degree of multiple-bank lending. 
 
                                                 
4   The Ce.Bi. rating  is a risk indicator  ranging from 1 to 9, where 1 denotes low-risk firms and 9 the riskiest 
enterprises. In Table 3 the 9 rating classes have been grouped into 3 categories: low (ratings 1 and 2), medium (ratings 
3 and 4) and high risk (ratings from 5 to 9). Tab. 3: multiple-bank lending and firm risk 
Low Medium High Total
No. of banks (median)  5 7 8 7
Up to 3 26.4 16.8 14.7 16.5
4 13.9 10.5 8.5 9.7
5 12.9 10.8 9.4 10.2
6 11.1 10.2 8.8 9.5
7 8.3 9.1 8.5 8.7
Over 7 27.4 42.6 50.0 45.4

















Source: Credit Register and UBI Datawarehouse Corporate 
 
 
3  The determinants of the degree of multiple-bank lending 
 
In the previous section a set of variables associated to the degree of multiple-bank 
lending has been highlighted, showing, inter alia, the need to consider multivariate 
analyses in order to take into account the joint effects of all these variables on the degree 
of multiple bank lending.  
 
Thus, in order to analyse the determinants of the degree of multiple-bank lending an 
ordered logit model has been estimated. The dependent variable – the degree of multiple-
bank lending – has been divided into 4 classes defined as follows: 
 
1)  up to 3 banks; 
2)  from 4 to 7 banks; 
3)  from 8 a 10 banks; 
4)  over 10 banks 
 
The variables taken into consideration as explanatory variables are: the size of the firm 
(measured as the natural logarithm of revenues - SIZE), the dependence of the firm from bank debt (proxied by the share of bank debt on total debt - BANKDEBT), the firm’s 
degree of risk given by four dummy variables indicating the fact that the firm falls into 
one of four rating classes (as provided by the Ce.Bi. rating – d_RATING_i for i from 1 to 
4),
5 and a set of regional and industry dummies which serve as control variables. In order 
to differentiate the effect of the firm’s risk factor according to size, the dummy 
d_RATING_i has been interacted with three size dummies representing small (up to 10 
mln euro of revenues), medium (revenues from 10 to 50 mln euro), and large (revenues 
over 50 mln euro) enterprises respectively.
6 
 
The model, therefore, estimates the likelihood that a certain firm belongs to one of the 
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where MULT is the multiple-bank lending class which can assume values from 1 to 4 (as 
specified above). The model is estimated using Credit Register data (containing bank-
firm relationships information) referred to the end of 2003, while balance sheet data taken 
from Ce.Bi. are referred to end 2002.
7 
 
                                                 
5   It is an increasing measure of risk which varies from 1 to 9, where 1 indicates a low risk firm and 
9 an high risk firm. 
6   A model has been estimated considering, besides the mentioned variables, also the age of the firm among the 
explanatory variables. The variable is positively and significantly associated with the degree of multiple bank lending. 
Since this result does not substantially differ from the results described in what follows, it is not reported (to save 
space). 
7   The model has been estimated also using bank-firm relationship information referred to end-2002. 
The results are basically unchanged. The results of the model highlight that the probability of engaging in a multiple-bank 
lending relationship increases in firm size, the dependence from bank debt and firm risk 
(Table 4).  
 
Table 4: ordered logit model results 
Dependent variable  = degree of multiple bank lending (measured in 4 classes)
Number of observations = 21,946
Pseudo R2 = 0.1519
Coefficient std. Err z P > z
SIZE 0.83 0.03 30.92 0.00
BANKDEBT 0.01 0.00 17.16 0.00
d_RATING 2*d_Small 0.52 0.06 8.64 0.00
d_RATING 3*d_Small 1.07 0.06 18.61 0.00
d_RATING 4*d_Small 1.15 0.09 12.25 0.00
d_RATING 1*d_Medium 0.16 0.09 1.73 0.08
d_RATING 2*d_Medium 0.86 0.07 11.66 0.00
d_RATING 3*d_Medium 1.54 0.07 21.71 0.00
d_RATING 4*d_Medium 1.30 0.15 8.49 0.00
d_RATING 1*d_Large 0.07 0.16 0.41 0.69
d_RATING 2*d_Large 0.63 0.13 4.97 0.00
d_RATING 3*d_Large 1.31 0.13 10.34 0.00
d_RATING 4*d_Large 0.83 0.33 2.56 0.01
d_IND 0.68 0.15 4.44 0.00
d_SER 0.10 0.15 0.67 0.51
d_CON 0.56 0.16 3.55 0.00
d_NW -0.17 0.03 -5.17 0.00
d_NE -0.65 0.03 -19.12 0.00
d_SOUTH -0.19 0.05 -4.29 0.00
 
Source: Credit Register and UBI Datawarehouse Corporate 
 
In particular, the association between the degree of risk and the likelihood of being a firm 
which recurs to multiple-bank lending highlights two interesting findings. First, the 
coefficients measuring the sensitiveness of the degree of multiple-bank lending to the 
balance sheet rating appear significantly higher for medium sized firms than for small 
and large enterprises. This may reflect a tendency of banks which are not willing to grant credit over a certain amount to riskier firms, forcing them to use multiple-bank lending 
relationships to get the quantity of credit they need. In turn, such behaviour could reflect 
a certain degree or risk aversion on the part of banks, which may derive from a difficulty 
in assessing the real risk posed to them by some firms, in this case medium size firms. 
Indeed, as shown in Section 4, the results of a recent survey on corporate governance, 
conducted by UniCredit Banca d’Impresa on a sample of over 800 Italian firms, highlight 
the fact that medium enterprises are characterised by a corporate governance structure 
and degree informational opaqueness very similar to those of small firms. However, 
while the effect on a bank balance sheet of the difficulty in assessing the real risk of 
exposures towards small firms (stemming from informational opaqueness) is overall 
limited, such effect could be of a much larger magnitude in the case of medium firms, 
thus generating the mentioned risk aversion and therefore multiple-bank lending. 
 
The second interesting finding of the model is the fact that the degree of multiple-bank 
lending for medium size and, especially, large size firms does not monotonously increase 
as does the firm’s risk profile. For example, the estimated coefficient for the rating 
category 3 (for medium and large firms) is larger than the one for the rating category 4. 
This would suggest that those firms falling into the rating class 3 (comprising the Ce.Bi. 
ratings from 5 to 7), and therefore with a medium-to-high risk, make use of multiple-bank 
lending in order to reduce the risk of being credit rationed and/or to obtain lower interest 
rates on their loans. By contrast, recurring to multiple-bank lending would appear 
difficult for the riskiest firms, namely those falling into the rating class 4 (Ce.Bi. ratings 8 
and 9).  
 
Once the coefficients of the model have been estimated, it might be interesting to assess 
the economic meaningfulness of the variables employed as determinants of the degree of 
multiple bank lending (beyond their statistical significance). This can be done by 
calculating the marginal probabilities that a firm belongs to a certain multiple-bank 
lending class according to different values of the explanatory variables. The marginal 
probabilities are obtained by simply substituting the estimated coefficients in the logistic 
function, varying the values of the explanatory variable of interest and keeping constant (for example at their average) those of the other variables. Table 5 reports the marginal 
probabilities of having more than 10 lending relationships associated with different 
values of the independent variables. In particular, the exercise considers the marginal 
probabilities at the average, at the 75-th and 95-th percentile of the explanatory variable. 
Of course, in the case of the dummy variables indicating the firm’s degree of risk the 
marginal probabilities are referred to the change of the variable from 0 to1. 
 
As the table illustrates the size variable is highly significant from an economic viewpoint: 
the probability of engaging in lending relationships with more than 10 banks, moves in 
fact from 30.43%, in the case the log of revenues is equal to the average, to 46.08% and 
76.54% when the size variable equals the 75-th and 95-th percentiles respectively. 
 
By contrast, the variable representing the dependence from bank debt (share of bank debt 
on total debt) does not appear economically significant. The probability of having a high 
degree of multiple-bank lending increases of less than 4 percentages points (from 30.48% 
to 34.13%) when the variable changes from the average value to the 75-th percentile. 
This is probably due to the fact that this variable has a very low variability within the 
sample: indeed a percentage over 70% of the sampled firms has a share of bank debt 
above 80%. 
 
The effect of the rating variable is instead quite high. Taking for example the economic 
significance of the dummy variable rating 3 for the medium sized firms, one yields that 
the marginal probability to have more than 10 lending relationships increases from 25.1% 
to 61% when the dummy changes from the value 0 to 1. 
 Table 5: Economic significance of the variables 
Explanatory variable Mean value 75th percentile 95th percentile
SIZE 30.43% 46.08% 76.54%













Effect of the risk dummy variables
d_RATING 4*d_Large
d_RATING 3*d_Large











Source: Credit Register and UBI Datawarehouse Corporate 
 
 
4 Multiple-bank  lending  relationships and firms’ governance features 
In the previous section it has been suggested that the degree of multiple-bank lending is 
an increasing function of firms’ degree of risk and that this could be somehow interpreted 
as the effect of banks’ risk aversion towards those firms whose risk is more difficult to be 
assessed because of weaknesses in their governance structure and/or because of the 
opaqueness of the information provided. Indeed, a recent paper by Carletti et al. (2004) 
maintains that the degree of multiple-bank lending is directly associated with the 
monitoring costs of the different exposures. The greater is the difficulty (the cost) of 
banks to evaluate and monitor their customers’ risk profile, the higher would be the 
degree of multiple-bank lending. It is also likely that such costs could be somehow 
correlated with the firms’ governance features. It is intuitive in fact that governance 
structures characterised by lower informational transparency or, more in general, a lesser degree of protection of the so-called outsiders (minority shareholders, external financiers, 
etc.) tend to raise monitoring costs. 
 
As an extension of the analyses conducted in the previous section, the information 
coming from a recent survey on the corporate governance of Italian firms, recently 
conducted by UniCredit Banca d’Impresa (UBI) on a sample of over 800 customer firms, 
has been used in order to verify whether the degree of multiple bank-lending can be 
somehow associated with characteristics of firms’ corporate governance.
8 
 
The results of this survey confirm some well-known features of the governance of Italian 
firms, as the high degree of ownership concentration, the widespread presence of groups 
even informal, the prevalence of informal governance structures, characterised by the 
lack of explicit and codified rules and binding external control mechanisms aimed at 
protecting creditors and minority shareholders. Besides these features, the survey also 
highlights a certain degree of heterogeneity in some governance elements, with regard in 
particular to the size of the firms. More specifically, the survey shows that medium size 
enterprises are characterised by governance features similar to those of small firms as 
regards in particular the informational opaqueness or, more in general, the degree of 
protection of external financiers. 
 
With these findings in mind, the ordered-logit model employed in Section 3 has been 
estimated again using the data of the firms sampled in the survey, and adding to the 
explanatory variables previously considered an indicator summarising firms’ governance 
features. In particular, the indicator is a dummy variable specifying the fact that the firm 
has (=1) or not (=0) a formal or codified governance structure. Specifically, a governance 
structure is defined as formal or codified when the following three conditions are met: 
 
a)  the firm CEO or managing director  is not relative of the firm owner; 
b)  the firm has independent members within its board of directors; 
                                                 
8   Please note that when combining the information from the survey with the Credit Register and the 
balance sheet data, the sample size reduced quite significantly. c)  the firm has a planning and control system. 
 
The results of the model (Table 6) confirms the findings obtained in the previous section 
with the larger sample of firms: the degree of multiple-bank lending is positively 
associated with firm’s size, its dependence from bank debt (not statistically significant, 
though) and its degree of risk. The variable summarising the firm’s governance features 
is statistically significant and enters with the expected sign: relying on a formalised 
governance system reduces the probability of engaging in multiple-bank lending 
relationships since this may likely imply lower monitoring costs for banks. In other 
words, this result would suggest that, other things being equal, firms adopting a 
governance model with the potential to provide an higher degree of protection to 
outsiders are also those with fewer multiple-bank lending relationships, since banks are 
presumably less risk averse towards them. This negative relationship might be also 
interpreted as the tendency by the management of more opaque firms to use multiple 
bank lending as a device to reduce the intrusion of external financiers (banks) in the 
administration of the firm (as argued among other by Carletti (2004)). This is especially 
true when multiple-bank lending is associated with lower screening and monitoring 
activities by banks, and when the so called private benefits of control accruing to firm’s 
managers/owners are higher than the costs of maintaining lending relationships with 
several banks. 
 Table 6: ordered logit model results 
Dependent variable  = degree of multiple bank lending (measured in 4 classes)
Number of observations = 605
Pseudo R2 = 0,1839
Coefficient std. Err z P > z
SIZE 0.81 0.13 6.30 0.00
BANKDEBT 0.01 0.00 1.54 0.12
d_Rating high risk*d_Small 0.35 0.28 1.22 0.22
d_Rating low risk*d_Medium 0.37 0.38 0.98 0.33
d_Rating high risk*d_Medium 1.45 0.32 4.56 0.00
d_Rating low risk*d_Large 0.33 0.49 0.67 0.51
d_Rating high risk*d_Large 1.43 0.49 2.91 0.00
d_governance -0.95 0.39 -2.42 0.02
d_IND 0.09 0.61 0.16 0.88
d_SER 0.07 0.65 0.11 0.91
d_CON -0.57 0.62 -0.93 0.35
d_NW 0.71 0.26 2.72 0.01
d_NE 0.33 0.24 1.40 0.16
d_SOUTH -0.14 0.28 -0.49 0.62
 
Source: Credit Register and UBI Datawarehouse Corporate 
 
At this point, it might be useful to assess the economic meaningfulness of the different 
explanatory variables employed in the model. Once more, this is done by yielding the 
marginal probabilities to have more than 10 bank-lending relationships associated with 
different values of the independent variables.  
 
The results of this exercise confirms those previously obtained using  the larger sample 
(this constitutes, to some extent, an indirect robustness check for the model). In particular 
the test confirms the high economic significance for the size variable as well as for the 
risk indicator especially for medium and large firms. Indeed, in the case of medium size 
high-risk firms the probability of having more than 10 lending relationships increases 
from 48.5% to 79.8% when the risk dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. 
 More importantly, the variable summarising the firm’s governance features also exhibits 
a relatively high economic meaningfulness: the marginal probability of multiple bank 
lending decreases in fact from 55.7 to 32.7% as the firm moves from an informal to a 
more codified corporate governance structure. Although alternative explanations could 
not be ruled out, these findings would thus provide some empirical support to the thesis 
that multiple-bank lending might constitute a rational response of banks to overcome a 
difficulty in assessing the real degree of risk of some borrowers.  
 
Table 7: Economic significance of the variables 
Explanatory variable Mean value 75th percentile 95th percentile
SIZE 53.60% 70.47% 91.05%














Effect of the risk and governance dummy variables
 
Source: Credit Register and UBI Datawarehouse Corporate 
 
5  Summary and conclusions 
 
This analysis on one of the main features of the bank-firm relationship in Italy, multiple-
bank lending, underlines that this feature is significantly and importantly related to 
characteristics of firms’ corporate governance. Enterprises having a more informal and 
not codified governance system, which might be characterized by lower informational 
transparency or, more in general, lesser protection for third creditors, are also those with 
an higher degree of multiple-bank lending. While different interpretations could not be 
excluded, this would suggest that multiple-bank lending might be the consequence of a 
risk averse attitude of banks, thus constituting a sort of insurance mechanisms whereby banks overcome difficulties in assessing their customer firms. This issue seems 
particularly relevant especially for medium size firms which, on the one hand, exhibit 
corporate governance features similar to those of small firms and, on the other, show a 
degree of multiple bank lending comparable to that of large enterprises.  
 
This may have important policy implications. Indeed, a large body of literature on the 
bank-firm relationship highlights that the degree of multiple-bank lending is typically 
associated with lower credit availability especially in adverse cyclical conditions (the 
well known credit rationing issue). This is important also at the light of the new accord 
on banks’ capital requirements (Basel II). Indeed, if it is true that Basel II could bring 
about a generalized improvement in the ability of the banking sector to measure and 
manage risks, thus reducing the need to recourse to multiple bank-lending in order to 
overcome the uncertainty over the real degree of risk of the borrowers, it is also true that 
significant progresses in firms’ informational transparency as well as in their corporate 
governance structures are needed to achieve such results. The straight implication of this 
is that those firms not capable of making progress in their governance model might run 
the risk, in the near future, of suffering  from a significant tightening of their credit 
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